Il-Fondazzjoni Kelma

ĦSARA U DESTINI

Harold W. Percival

KAPITOLU IX

RE-EŻISTENZA

Taqsima 16

Għaliex hija x-xorti li l-bniedem ma jiftakarx l-eżistenzi preċedenti. It-taħriġ ta 'min jagħmel. Bniedem jaħseb fih innifsu bħala korp b'ismu. Biex tkun konxju ta 'u kif. Il- "I" falz u l-illużjonijiet tiegħu.

From the causes and the natura of memorja it becomes at once apparent why past lives are not remembered by the re-existing portion of the doer, and why it is that such memorji are not necessary for the education of the doer.

il raġuni why people do not remember the events of their past lives is that the records that the senses made of these events on the forma ta ’nifs, are destroyed before the doer portion returns to ħajja.

By memorja tal-bieb alone, that is, without the aid of sens-memorja, the human cannot remember the events of past lives. Memorji bieb are not concerned with events, but only with the states which these events produced, that is, with the sentimenti, xewqat, mental activities, fidi, kuxjenza or illumination. The human does not know how these states come, but he recognizes them when they do come. They are memorji of these states in past lives of the doer portion. The doer is frequently reproducing its own states of former lives, but because the means for sens-memorja have been wiped out, the human has nothing by which he can identify the states with the events that caused them. The states caused by the impressions of the former ħajja, Il- doer portion may have, but the state is the result, not the memorja, of the event in the former ħajja.

There are instances of persons remembering something of a past ħajja. They do not remember the whole ħajja as they do a great part of the present, but see only a figure, a street, a gate, a room, a valley. The scenes do not follow one another consecutively, though there is sometimes a connection between several scenes.

Beside the flashing up of such unarticulated scenes, there are sometimes memorji of events in which persons are in action. Then more appears than mere pictures. The events bring not only the vista of changing scenes and actions, but with them may come the smigħ of sounds and the tħossok of divertiment, biża or hate. These scenes or events must produce some tħossok u xewqa, U l- doer must identify itself as having some rigward to the persons, places or events in them, for them to be classed as memorji. Many persons have some such flashes, but even if these cause a tħossok, they are not usually related by the doer to itself and so are not felt as memorji. The people who believe these flashes to be memorji, are such as are responsive to impressions and have a tendency to clairvoyant perceptions. They have such memorji also when cycling ħsibijiet kawża doer states to be quickened into ħajja as memorji and some passing event is identified.

The manner in which these three classes of memorji of scenes and events are brought about differs. Similar or associated events can evoke them because, although the old forma ta ’nifs became inert, the impression was still on the aia u ppreservat fil - landa atmosfera psikika tal- doer and was transferred to the new forma ta ’nifs. Then from that impression can be worked a sens-memorja of a scene or event which caused the impression. When there is such a memorja it is at once distinguished as something which is foreign to the present ħajja and yet is intimate. Ħsibijiet ċikliżmu fil - atmosfera mentali stir it up and may cause the recurrence of doer states as memorji.

In the third class which is quite different, the doer esperjenzi something which has no connection with nor finds corroboration in any event of the present ħajja. il doer, stirred by a ħasbu related to an occurrence in a former ħajja, compels one or more of the senses to reproduce the event from the doer state and the ħasbu. The senses manufacture from the tħossok u mill ħasbu a new event similar to the other. This new event is felt to be a memorja and is identified with that which took place in the past and of which it is a counterpart.

Many persons claim to remember past lives, even if they have only momentary glimpses, without completeness and orientation. Still greater is the numru of those who see nothing, but may persuade themselves that their fabrications are memorji of past lives.

It is fortunate for the doer li l- memorji of the events of its past lives in human bodies are not with it in the present existence, for the education of the doer could not be accomplished if the uman could remember. If the doer did remember these events, it would be konxja of what it had done in the former personalità. To be so konxja would be due to a continuance of the memorji of the environments and conditions and of what the personalità then did and suffered. It would necessitate access to the marks on the forma ta ’nifs, which are dissipated when the personalità is broken up after mewt. Many persons biża that they may lose that personalità; they will surely lose it, but there is no more raġuni għal biża or regret that loss, than there is raġuni għal biża the loss of a worn-out suit of clothes. What makes the human konxja that he is the same personalità during any one ħajja, is due partly to the record of the acts and events engraved upon the forma ta ’nifs, and partly to the tħossok of the unbroken identità tal- I-ness tal- jaf tal- Triune Awto. Both these factors are necessary to give the uman a sense of being one and the same throughout ħajja; the presence of I-ness which is felt by the human, enables him to connect the memorji with the name of the body and to identify them from the simboli fuq il forma ta ’nifs. Meta dawn simboli are lost, the tħossok tal-preżenza ta ' I-ness is not strong enough to make one konxja of one-and-the-sameness.

A person remembering past lives would carry too great a burden of past events to have any libertà of action. He would be ashamed of his meanness, foolishness, hypocrisy, licentiousness, cruelty and crimes. He would be humiliated by the positions or situations in which he had found himself, or he might be carried away with egotism because of the characters as which he has figured, and might be filled with arrogance and puffed up with pride. He might be dominated by regħba to acquire again the riches and power once possessed. The memorja of comfort and distinction which once had been his might make present hardships quite unbearable. He might be blasted by disprament at the vainness of his efforts to overcome destin. Worst of all, future destin would be revealed to him by some of the memorji. He would be unable to do the dmirijiet of the present moment, which is as much as he should be concerned with. He might try to run away from destin or rush into it instead of meeting it as he should. He could not pass through temptations which are tests necessary for the development of the doer. Knowing the outcome beforehand he would not be tempted, and so would fail to get the training and tempering of character and the strength which overcoming the temptation can give. In any case memorja is not necessary for the education of the doer.

The education of the doer hija progress towards the state where it becomes a free and perfected doer. This development of the doer proceeds under the Dawl tal- Intelligence and is attained by means of repeated re-existences of the portions of the doer in human bodies. The doer learns something as the result of each existence of its various portions. Ħajja fuq il kostanti u esperjenzi from the senses are the means used for the training. The education goes on, not in the senses but in the doer itself, as it learns through its embodied portions from esperjenzi. The education goes on without sens-memorja, għalkemm il- esperjenzi are interlinked with sensi-memorji. Therefore, it is not necessary that one should bring into the present ħajja memorji of the events of past lives.

Memorja ta 'bieb, however, is necessary for the education. Memorji bieb are states of tħossok-and-xewqa, of mental attitudes and abilities and of I-ness u selfness. These states exist apart from any objects that might bring them into play, and they represent the results of esperjenzi through objects. These memorji fuq id-doer continue from past lives and they exist even in the present ħajja apparti l- esperjenzi of which they are the result. wieħed remembers the multiplication table without the memorja of how it was learned. wieħed has the capacity to read and yet does not remember the processes by which he acquired it. Some can use foreign languages, but do not remember how they learned them, especially if they did so during childhood. What they remember is a memorja tal-bieb, which appears as an ability. There is a gap between the repetition of the sound seven times three are twenty-one which the boy had made with the moħħ tal-ġisem, U l- fehim by the man that seven times three make twenty-one. The repetition of the arithmetical formula made sens-memorja, but the present ability to command the information contained in it, is memorja tal-bieb. il sens-memorja of the repetitions is gone, but the memorja tal-bieb remains as the ability to use the results without the aid of the sens-memorja. So it is with the knowledge of foreign tongues or with economic and ethical beliefs, as that one cannot benefit others without advancing himself or harm others without a disadvantage to himself or that a gentleman has self-control, integrity, honor, manjieri, and consideration for the drittijiet of others. Such abilities and convictions are present, but the details from which they resulted in the past or the present ħajja are not remembered. The education of the doer is furthered by such tagħlim, which is retained as a memorja tal-bieb. L-istess bħal memorja tal-bieb of incidents in the present ħajja remains when the sens-memorja of these events can no longer be recalled, so can it be available to that doer portion when it next exists.

il karattru with which a person is born and the traits brought out in the course of ħajja, his endowments, abilities and tendencies are memorji fuq id-doer. On them he builds with memorji fuq id-doer of sense impressions.

The development of a doer portion is determined by its ability to do the dritt thing at the dritt ħin, irrispettivament minnha memorja of what has gone before. There are twelve doer portions which re-exist, each in its turn. The portion which re-exists was the next in turn and is guided by its ħasbu fid-deċiżjoni, which brings back memorji fuq id-doer as sentimenti, kif xewqat and as mental attitudes. This portion of the doer is embodied by attaching itself to its stations and organs as they mature and as the uman grows up. At first little, then more and in old age usually less, of the selected portion is connected with the body. Development of the organs and outside influences affect the functioning of the embodied portion of the doer. Hence the outlook upon ħajja changes. A child, a schoolboy, a married person, a business man, and an old man or woman, all take different views of things. Notwithstanding the limitations as to the varying amount and functioning of the embodied portion of the doer, the education of the doer is carried on by the Dawl tal- Intelligence.

Il - porzjon inkorporat tal - IFRS doer is drugged by the body and intoxicated by the senses. While this condition exists there is no full communication between the portion in the body and the eleven portions that are not in the body, but there is nevertheless a rigward. What the embodied portion does or suffers affects of course the portions not embodied. The body as a whole is improved or retarded by what is done through the body by its embodied portion.

Though only one portion of a doer is in the station and organs, yet at times of passjoni or excitement, or at times of biża or tama, or of egotism or illumination, there is a surcharge. This comes from the non-existing portions. When there is a tension, more of the doer can be contained in the body than in the normal state, and in marda or enfeeblement less is present.

The embodied portion is the only means by which the doer comes into rigward mal- kostanti. This in itself might explain why the progress of dawk li jwettqu is slow; but more telling is the fatt that the interiorizations which come through that small portion in the body do not go far. They do not usually go beyond gross tħossok-and-xewqa, because all that bnedmin usually care for is what they want and whether things are pleasant or unpleasant. Therefore no mental results are attained beyond ħiliet in procuring the things they want. Because the interiorizations do not produce mental results of tagħlim, umanità has been slumming for millions of years. Nevertheless, training is accomplished by the Dawl tal- Intelligence.

There are indications of the interrelation of the embodied portion of the doer mal- ħassieb u jaf. The most familiar is the voice of kuxjenza as it warns against or forbids xewqat. Other instances are that at times in critical conditions, as of trial, disaster or revolution, one may feel an influx of dawl or power, rise above his ordinary condition and become a captain of the crowd of which he was but one; that at times while reading a book, something in a scene or event mentioned may cause one to identify himself with a similar scene or event, though he has never been connected with anything of the kind in the present ħajja; that in silent moments one may become konxja as a being totally different from that of the uman of sentimenti u xewqat as which he usually exists; that at times one may become konxja of things that have nothing to do with the senses; that on rare occasions one is illuminated, the present disappears without leaving any sensazzjoni, ecstasy or exaltation and there is a calm, serene, comprehensive and konxja feeling beyond the senses; and that in rare cases one may be konxja ta ' identità, which is beyond his feeling of identità and is before and beyond time.

Because of these interrelations the esperjenzi kept as memorji fuq id-doer by the non-existing portions are made by the Dawl tal- Intelligence to educate the embodied portion gradually and so train the doer. As the human advances, more of the doer can come in, until in a perfect body all twelve portions of the doer can, in turn, come in. Then the doer is konxja as the entire doer parti mill- Triune Awto.

The training goes on not only without a memorja of the events of past lives and although different portions of the doer re-exist in its successive bnedmin, but even though the human has a false identità and does not know who he is.

The human has a name in the world and thinks of himself as the being having that name. He is konxja of a continuity of himself as a being having that name; he is konxja dik tiegħu personalità persists, at least, from birth till mewt. Usually not much of an examination is made to find out who this being is or how he is composed and of what. He is composed first, of a radiant-airy-fluid-solid physical body; second, of the four senses which maintain this fourfold body and connect it with and relate it to natura; third, of the forma ta ’nifs which exists in the involuntary nervous system, gives forma għall- Astral body, coordinates and operates the four systems and the movements of the physical body and is the link between natura u l- doer. These three altogether make up the personalità. And fourth, there is the re-existing portion of the doer. In addition there is present Dawl tal- Intelligence li l- doer receives and which it sends out into and reclaims from natura. Only the solid part of the physical body is visible; to that the name is attached and with that the human is identified and identifies himself.

No distinction is made between the invisible parts. They are held to belong to the visible, as these are the only parts perceptible. Erroneous and inaccurate notions obtain concerning the invisible. So the forma ta ’nifs is mistakenly called the subconscious mind or the subconscious self; the Astral body is spoken of as the ruħ, or its funzjonijiet are mistaken for those of the forma ta ’nifs; the four senses are not looked upon as separate beings, but are called funzjonijiet of organs; tħossok, an aspect of the doer itself, is called a fifth sense; and gross injoranza exists concerning the “mind".

The human is konxja, he is konxja li hu konxja and so he is konxja of having an identità, the one that is related to the body to which the name is attached and which the human speaks of as himself. But that identità, while some sort of an identità, is not the real one. It is a fatt li hu konxja of something he calls “I,” but his fehim of it and his tħossok of it are self-deceptions, and if he looks for it he does not find it at once. Each physical ċellula hija konxja unità, huwa konxja as tagħha funzjonijiet; each unità of Astral, of airy, of fluid and of solid kwistjoni making up the fourfold body, is konxja in the same way, that is, konxja as its function; each sense is konxja as its function. The embodied portion of the doer which is intelligent-kwistjoni and no longer natura-kwistjoni, Huwa konxja in a different way. It is konxja of tagħha funzjonijiet, but it is also konxja li huwa konxja. Le unità tan-natura can be so konxja.

Il - porzjon inkorporat tal - IFRS doer is konxja of nnifisha bħala tħossok, that it feels, and is konxja of the impressions of seeing, smigħ, tasting, smelling and being in contact. It is konxja li xewqat to feel these impressions. It is konxja li dan tħossok and desiring is pleasant or unpleasant. The impressions made upon tħossok-and-desire are translated by ħsieb into descriptive terms usable by tħossok or desire. Without the ħsieb there could be no appreciation of things, aside from their grossest impressions.

Events affect the doer when the sense transmits to tħossok the impressions received through the sense organ. These impressions are taken by xewqa and are transferred to tjubija. From there they are translated into descriptive terms, such as bright, broad, noisy, rhythmic, bitter, fragrant, hot, soft; and neglect, quarrel, delicacy, affection, kindness, sympathy, play. Not only impressions brought in by the senses but also reactions of the doer to phenomena of natura and to human actions are separated, arranged, classed and described by ħsieb. Tħossok u xewqa simply get impressions and react to them. This can be seen in the effect which a bunch of cornstalks or a red cloth has upon a bull. The reactions in a human would be just as unintelligent if he did not think. Emozzjonijiet of imħabba u rabja would be as crude and wild and without sentiment as in the case of an animal. The psychic refinements of preferenza, sentiment, passjoni, luxuriousness, biża, suffering or grief are due to the service which the mind renders to the doer.

il doer is susceptible to all these because it can think, but this does not give it a perception of one-and-the-same-ness, permanence, endlessness. Yet the doer, while not konxja as this continuity, has a vague tħossok that there is this continuity somewhere, and xewqat to be it. That the embodied portion of the doer and the contacting portion of the ħassieb are both konxja of themselves, konxja of identità, is due to the presence of the jaf, which gives them this tħossok u fehim of continuity and one-and-the-same-ness in their essence.

il ħassieb is konxja as this continuity. The ħassieb u l- jaf are as one. The doer is not in communication with the ħassieb, or with the jaf; it cannot distinguish itself from natura or from the senses, as dak li hu Meta jipprova jaħseb fih innifsu as a continuity and one-and-the-same-ness, it has a tħossok of identità u xewqat to have or to be this identità. It gets no further than this tħossok and this desire, which come through the tħossok-moħħ u x-xewqamind. Tagħhom ħsieb does not reach the jaf, but because they are connected with the ħassieb, they communicate the presence of identità għal tħossok-and-desire. Because of the presence of identità l- doer thinks about it and attaches that to the desired tħossok of continuity of the personalità having the name. This tħossok is a false “I.” Thus the ħsieb mal- moħħ tal-ġisem deludes the human, to satisfy the desire with the ħasbu u l- tħossok of identità bħala l- personalità.

The contacting portion of the jaf is konxja as I-ness u as selfness u hu konxja of the embodied portion of the doer. I-ness, Kif l- identità, extends without limit through ħin; it has no beginning and no end. It is an unbroken continuity. Selfness is that aspect of the jaf which knows it is knowledge, and knows not merely of the continuity and sequence of events through ħin, but all things as they are and at once. It knows the sum of the memorji tal tagħha doer as its psychic part and of its ħassieb as its mental part. It knows not only what it as a Triune Awto has done, but what all other Triune Selves have done, and has part in the sum of knowledge which is common to all Triune Selves. As I-ness u selfness, Il- jaf knows itself in endlessness. The jaf is the real “I” and the real Self.

The human is konxja of tiegħu tħossok-and-xewqa; he is konxja of his mental activity and that he can in a way use it at will for ħsieb, imma hu mhux konxja of any of the things that the jaf is konxja as or knows. However, the jaf is the source of identità fil-bniedem. Il doer u l- ħassieb have aspects of the jaf, minħabba l- Triune Awto is wieħed. The presence of I-ness produces in the ħassieb an intimacy with and an appreciation of I-ness; and in the doer it produces a reflection, a tħossok of I-ness u xewqa għall Awto-għarfien. This causes the fabrication of the false “I” by the moħħ tal-ġisem. So the human thinks himself to be “I” and feels himself to be “I.”

Therefore he says “I see,” “I hear,” “I move,” “I feel divertiment,” and feels himself as an “I” that does this. This “I” is attached to the body with its name. The human is ignorant of how he comes to this conception of “I.” The ħasbu is erroneous and is furnished by the moħħ tal-ġisem under the lure of the senses and the pressure of xewqa. When the human says “I feel,” “I think,” the “I” is again a false “I,” furnished by the ħasbu to satisfy the tħossok which wants to be “I”-ness; and this illużjoni is strengthened by links of memorja, Il- memorji of acts and events, conditions and places.

The test of what this “I” of the uman is, is found in what he is konxja kif. Hu konxja normalment as sentimenti u xewqat, not even as a mind, and certainly not as raġuni or tjubija.

The false “I” is the tħossok, tħossok the presence of the real “I” of the jaf. il doer tħossok itself as the “I” is under an illużjoni, and it is unconscious that the illużjoni is due to a ħasbu maħluqa minn ħsieb to satisfy the craving of xewqa itself to have identità as “I.” When the human thinks, he is conscious of l- ħsieb, Iżda mhux as ħsieb. He is at times conscious of il-preżenza tal-vera "I," imma mhux as the real “I.” So he feels that he has an identità, that he is the same uman he was a week or a year ago. But he does not locate this identità, which remains a mystery to him, because he does not communicate with the jaf.

The false “I” is real, but only as tħossok-and-xewqa and as the ability to think; it is not real as I-ness. Because real things are back of the illużjoni, these real things, which are the embodied portion of the doer u l- atmosfera psikika ma tagħha memorji fuq id-doer, can be reached; and so the human can be trained even through the false “I.” Whatever happens to the false “I” affects some realtà behind it. Pleasure, marda, intoxication, injury and comfort of the human go beyond the illużjoni of the false “I” and reach the non-embodied portions of the doer. The effect they produce there lasts longer than the earth ħajja and longer than the lines on the forma ta ’nifs u l- sensi-memorji that these make. The effect is esperjenza. il esperjenzi which come through the existing portion of the doer help to produce the karattru tal- atmosfera psikika u l- Kwalitajiet tal- doer, and their record in the noetic atmosfera is the knowledge which speaks as kuxjenza.

Continued pressure, troubles, hardships, uġigħ and discomfort which are experienced through destin fiżiku, train the doer along moral lines away from indifference, selfishness, hatred, bigotry and b'malizzja, toward paċenzja, sympathy and goodwill. Memorji bieb of these states come from the atmosfera psikika as sentimenti u xewqat to the human. Sentimenti of or xewqat for generosity, paċenzja, sympathy and goodwill that come over a man are memorji fuq id-doer of states through which the re-existing portion of the doer has passed in the lives of its former personalitajiet. This is one branch of the training of the doer and relates to a man’s attitude towards others.

There is another branch, which relates to his attitude towards himself. This attitude also is the result of memorji fuq id-doer ġol atmosfera psikika. So there will come, because of the memorji fuq id-doer that have accumulated, a ħin when there is a tħossok in the human that he is not what he feels himself to be, and this starts the xewqa to be shown what he really is and what is that identità or “I” which he feels. Gradually, ħsieb, always at the service of tħossok-and-xewqa, will make it clear that the identità is quite different from tħossok-and-xewqa; dak tħossok-and-xewqa jista 'jkun konxja of I-ness iżda mhux as I-ness, li l- identità is with and in I-ness tal- Triune Awto and not with tħossok-and-xewqa.

In the meantime the general training of the doer can go on, because the events affecting the uman and its false “I” affect the indwelling portion of the doer and then the non-embodied portions and also its psychic and mental atmosferi.

Il-ġirja ta ' bnedmin do not make an effort to find out who and what they are. They do not even think that their personalitajiet are not the entities they believe them to be. Yet the education of the dawk li jwettqu goes on. It goes on though they do not know of it any more than they know of the involuntary processes which maintain their bodies, digest their ikel and circulate their blood. The education goes on whether they wish it or not. The doer-memorji, without the events that caused them, are preserved. In the run of bnedmin l- tagħlim is small, very small, still they learn a little.

il doer in each human without knowing its predecessors inherits from them the sum of the memorji ta 'tagħhom esperjenzi and makes its way through ħajja with this inheritance. The continuity relates to memorji fuq id-doer, not to whether its bnedmin huma konxja of or as each other.